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W H E N E V E R we speak of social change, it helps to specify in which
of its two major meanings we wish to employ the concept. For the social
sciences have always analyzed social change in two perspectives. First,
social (or 'historical') change is conceived of as a set of blind and
impersonal forces, structural trends and contradictions to which human
agents are exposed as objects, if not as passive victims to whom change
'happens'. Social change of this sort consists of trends (ranging from
global warming to shifting consumer tastes) which have neither been
initiated by someone nor can they be stopped by anybody. Second, social
change is seen as something that results from deliberate and intentional
efforts of rational human agents to cope, individually or collectively,
with needs and problems that they encounter in social, economic and
political life. Social change in this second sense is deliberately 'accom-
plished' and executed by agents. This activist and purposive version of
the concept emphasizes subjectivity, cooperation, and the rational pur-
suit of interests and values—the 'making' of history rather than the
exposure to anonymous historical fates and forces.
A synthesis of these seemingly incompatible modes of understanding
social change is classically suggested by Karl Marx in his The 18th
Brumaire and later writings on the political economy of capitalism: the
fateful forces of historical change (i) to which agents fall victim are
themselves triggered and set in motion by human agency and its aggre-
gate and unanticipated side-effects—the critical implication being that
• This paper is based upon a lecture ('Pres- David Abraham, John Ballard, Robert E.
ent historical transitions and some basic design Goodin, Stephen Holmes and Osvaldo Sunkel.
options for societal institutions') the author has (i) Rather than the unambiguously desir-
presented to the Congress on 'Society and the able ones brought about by Smith's 'invisible
Reform of the State', Sao Paulo, March 26-29, hand'!
1998. Helpful comments were provided by
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the deficiencies of human agency and of the standards of rationality it
follows are the causes both of those fateful forces themselves and of the
agents' failure to cope with them in sustainable ways and with desirable
results. The theory that ties fateful results to such institutionally neces-
sitated blindness and other deficiencies of agency is a theory of crisis. As
is well known, Marx and some Marxists believed that the institutions
that make for the misdirection of agency can themselves be altered
through a very special kind of agency—an agency conceptualized in
terms of 'revolution' and 'class struggle'. But much of the evidence
accumulated in the 20th century suggests that revolutionary sorts of
second-order agency (or agency acting upon the institutional framework
of agency) suffer from the same kind of blindness and deficiency that is
being held against first-order agency and its deficiencies.
Nevertheless, the same problematique of how agents fail and how
agency can be re-configured is still central to many of today's social
theorists, be they guided by 'institutionalist' (2) or game-theoretic and
Rational Choice (3) paradigms. In these traditions of social and political
research, two key questions are being pursued, one positive and one
normative. The positive question is this: how are particular configura-
tions of agents (e.g. those which we find in markets, in firms, in inter-
national relations) related to particular outcomes of their agency? From
this, the normative consideration follows: which changes in the confi-
guration of agents would result in outcomes that are superior to the ones
observed, in terms of evaluative criteria such as peace, sustainability or
social justice?
These are the terms of reference of our contemporary debates on the
institutional design of state-society-relations. In my present discussion
of these relations, I proceed as follows. First, I shall reiterate a few
dominant trajectories of social change that all of us, almost irrespective
of what part of the world we come from, are critically exposed to.
Second, I want to switch from the passive to the active mode in order to
discuss the agents (namely citizens), as well as their modes of action
(namely civility), that might cope with and turn into tolerable or even
desirable outcomes the forces of change which we must confront.
Finally, and building upon the discussion of civility, I'll specify six
fallacies that must be avoided in order for citizens within civil society to
arrive at an adequately competent configuration of agency.
(2) Cf. Peter HALL and Rosemary TAYLOR, (3) Cf. the telling title of a collection edited
Political Science and the Three New Institu- by Brian BARRY and Russel HARDIN, Rational
tionalisms, Political Studies, XLIV (1996): Man in Irrational Society} (London: Sage,
952-973. 1982).
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I . Current trajectories of transition and change
a) Democratization. Let me start by reiterating that the overwhelming
change that has taken place in the past 25 years on a global scale and that
is still going on has occurred on the level of the political order, or the
polity, of many societies. Authoritarian regimes of various sorts—
military dictatorships, state socialist regimes, theocratic regimes—have
crumbled to an unprecedented extent and given way to (at least nominal)
liberal constitutional democracies. These are roughly defined by equal
political participation rights of all citizens, the guarantee of human,
civic and political rights, and the accountability of governing elites. The
global phenomenon of mass transition to democracy was pulled by
intentions inspired by the ideals associated with the democratic regime
form, as well as pushed by causal mechanism. Let us briefly consider
each of these factors.
What were the reasons that have led so many people, elites and masses
alike, to advocate and adopt some version of the democratic regime
form? What is democracy deemed to be 'good for', or capable of
accomplishing? Four cumulative answers come to mind. First, there is
the 'liberal' achievement of rights and liberties being guaranteed and the
drawing of a clear demarcating line between what can be contingent
upon the outcome of the political process and the conflicts of interest
entering into it, and what can not, or only under particular circum-
stances, be the object of such conflict because it is constitutionally en-
trenched. It is worth noting that in a democracy most of the conditions
that are of great interest to citizens (e.g. who can voice which opinions
or own which resources) are not normally a potential object of the
collective decision making of even vast majorities because they are
constitutionally entrenched. As a consequence of both rights and
procedures being thus guaranteed as well as supposedly implemented
through the day-to-day operation of the judicial system, democracies
make for a non-violent, limited, and civilized character of political
conflict and incremental change.
This civilizing potential of the democratic regime form is probably
its overwhelming attraction for those who had emerged from the horrors
and terrors of defunct predecessor regimes. A second reason for the
normative attractiveness of the democratic regime form is its 'interna-
tional' accomplishment, normally expressed in the 'democratic peace'
hypothesis, dating back to Kant's famous formulation of 1795. It posits
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that democracies will not wage war against other democracies (4).
Third, the 'social progress' accomplishment. As democracies rest upon
majority rule, and as majorities are typically made up of those who do
not share in economic privilege and social power, and as democratic state
power, constitutionally entrenched rigidities notwithstanding, is in fact
able to affect the size and distribution of economic resources (e.g.
through policies of growth, taxation and social security) in more than
marginal ways, democracies will normally work to serve the interests of
the less privileged segments of the population, thereby promoting
'positive' or 'social' rights and, more generally, growth, prosperity and
social justice.
Finally, the 'republican' accomplishment of transforming 'subjects'
into 'citizens', i.e. agents committed to and capable of employing their
cognitive and moral resources in deliberative and intelligent ways so as
to solve political problems, according to a logic of collective learning,
and eventually striving to serve the 'public good'.
But democratization is not just pulled by those reasons and the hopes
attached to them. Its introduction was also pushed by causes. The
internal decomposition of authoritarian regime forms and their failure
to sustain the functions of a state in confrontation with domestic and
international challenges made democracy the regime form chosen 'by
default'. Democracies come typically into being as a compromise
entrenching the second-most preferred option of all those who are too
weak to impose their respective (non-liberal-democratic) most preferred
option. As neither military leaders nor party elites could successfully
claim sovereignty, 'the people' remained the only conceivable bearer of
sovereignty. This choice has been enforced by two types of external
agents. Liberal democracy was often installed through pressures and
encouragements coming from other liberal democratic nations and their
supranational organizations. Moreover, it has often been the preference
of investors (whose investment is urgently needed by new democracies
for the sake of their economic development and recovery) to operate
under regime forms which meet the minimum requirements of rule of
law, security of contract, and accountability of political elites.
Taken together, the combined outcomes of the push and pull factors
underlying the mass transition to democracy that we have experienced
over the past three decades are today often being commented upon with
(4) We might note, however, that in a world war. The Gulf War had demonstrated that
of international regimes and security alliances, even dictators can be stopped from attacking
democracy is a sufficient, but not a necessary, and occupying neighbors,
condition for the prevention of international
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a sense of disenchantment. While the new wave of democratization has
virtually everywhere confirmed the democratic peace hypothesis, it has
not consistently redeemed the hopes for a reliable protection of equal
human, civil and political rights, elite accountability, economic progress,
social justice, or civic virtue practised by the citizenry. In particular,
there is no evidence that prosperity and social justice (in any of its
various meanings) is promoted by democracy as a matter of course (5).
As the number of democracies increases, their quality seems to
decrease (6), giving rise to well-founded complaints of new democracies
having degenerated into mere 'electoralist' or 'delegative' democra-
cies (7), if not outright defective democracies with 'reserved
domains' (8) controlled as a privilege by non-accountable elites. In sum,
we can say that the democratic regime form is an indispensable pre-
requisite, but evidently no automatic assurance, of the qualities that
have been associated with it by the protagonists of the transition to
democracy.
b) 'Globalization'. One explanation for this mixed and often
somewhat disappointing experience of democratic transitions has to do
with the weakening of the nation state and its governing capacities. This
is the theme of global interdependence (or, at least, macro-regional
interdependence, as in the European Union). The condition of intensi-
fied transnational connectedness shapes the fates of societies. It brings
forces to bear upon social and economic life which are largely outside the
control of even the most determined national political elites. As borders
are permeable and perforated, the range of what can be collectively and
effectively accomplished by domestic political forces shrinks (9),
because of the damaging repercussions from the outside international
arena that any 'wrong move' is anticipated to provoke. Borders, it seems,
have lost not only their limiting, but also their protective and hence
enabling, capacity. The media through which the governing capacity of
nation states is partly disabled due to interdependency and the ensuing
(5) It used to be argued by the'structuralist' (7) Cf. Guillermo O'DONNELL, Delegative
school of democratic theorists that an ad- Democracy, Journal of Democracy, 5 (1995),
vanced economy is a determinant or prerequi- No. 1: 55-69.
site of democracy, and that in turn democracy (8) Cf. Juan LlNZ and Alfred STEPAN, Prob-
vvill enhance the potential for growth and lems of Democratic Transition and Consolida-
prosperity. Neither side of this feedback model tion. Southern Europe, South America, and
is supported by much of the current evidence. Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: John
(6) Cf. David BEETHAM, Defining and Hopkins UP, 1996).
Measuring Democracy (London: Sage, 1994) (9) As some have argued, to the point of
and Larry DIAMOND, IS the Third Wave making democracy pointless. Cf. Jean-Marie




loss of autarchy and self-sufficiency can be summarized through the
formula, perhaps to be taken half-seriously, of 'six M's': money,
mathematics, music, migration, military force and meteorology (or cli-
mate):
— money, as the medium of commerce and investment: between
1955 and 1989, the world GDP index has grown from 100 to 350, while
the world export index increased to almost 1100;
— mathematics: universalization of cognitive culture and technol-
ogies based upon it, all using Arab numbers, incidentally the only truly
universally understood medium of written communication;
— music/movies, as well as architecture: non-verbal means of
expression and communication; cross-national standardization of pat-
terns of life as informed by these esthetic forms and their ethical content;
— migration: as many states cannot protect or provide minimal living
conditions and liberties to all of their people, many other states receive
(and have no practical and legitimate means to avoid receiving) growing
numbers of aliens, refugees, migrant workers, denizens etc. within their
resident population;
— military resources: probably a minority of states enjoys military
autarchy, as they have either joined supranational military alliances
(such as NATO), depend upon the defense provided by other states, or are
constrained in their domestic and international policies by the presence
of military threat from other states; moreover the uncoupling of
'stateness' and 'military capacity' becomes manifest in the fact that the
capacity to make war is increasingly acquired by non-state actors (such
as separatist armies, ethnic movements, terrorist groups, or armed gangs
deployed by warlords);
— meteorology: the supply and quality of air and water, both within
relatively narrow tolerable ranges of temperature as well as its seasonal
and regional fluctuation and long term change, are known to be basic
parameters of human life and economic activity; the availability of these
resources is also known to depend upon the stability of an immensely
complex system of interaction which can be upset, entirely regardless of
state borders and on a global scale, by the externalities of production and
consumption (10).
The classical response to the threat of loss of governing capacity is
supranational integration and the formation of transnational regimes;
EU, ASEAN, NAFTA, MERCOSUR, as well as various transnational military
(10) It is worth noting in passing that one particular national communities have largely
item, a seventh M, is missing from this list. proved to be resistant to'globalizing'processes
The moral ideas and principles governing of diffusion and convergence.
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alliances and regimes of international regulation are cases in point.
Equally important, however, seems to be the opposite response to the
perceived weakness of the capacity of states to control their fates: the
retreat to smaller, sub-national units. Only seemingly paradoxically,
globalization involves incentives for 'life-boat behavior' and subnational
separation of the (relatively) rich, who quite rationally, from their point
of view, strive to defend, exploit and insulate their local or regional
competitive advantages, rather than sharing the proceeds with the wider
(and supposedly more vulnerable) state units to which they belong,
preferably through secession and separate state building (i i), or at least
through far-reaching forms of federalist fiscal autonomy.
The 'multi-media' process of globalization, together with the dual
transnational and subnational responses to it, amount to two kinds of
predominantly bad news concerning distributive justice. One is the bad
news pertaining to the advanced countries: their labor market perfor-
mance and social security is seen to be undermined by the mobility of
capital to the low wage countries of the South, with widening gaps of
social inequality within the advanced countries being one of the conse-
quences. This factor mobility is currently dramatically enhanced by new
technologies of transportation and communication. There is also the
reciprocal bad news for the poorer and economically less developed
countries: the Western standards and style of living which they try to
achieve and imitate constitute a 'positional' good which cannot be uni-
versalized (for resource and ecological reasons). As obvious as it is that
not everybody can earn twice the median income, it is evident that
Western ways of living, of consumption and transportation, cannot be
universalized for reasons of resource limitations and ecological sustain-
ability. But as there is no model of housing, transportation and
consumption at hand that would pose a viable alternative to Western
styles, distributional inequalities will again widen, as some in the non-
Western world will manage to imitate Western role models successfully,
while most will fail. The combined result of both of these bad news is
this: as the number of owners of luxury cars and air-conditioned
apartments grows in what was the Third World, so does the number of
people who search for food in the garbage containers in what was the
First World.
(11) At any rate, from the mineral-rich in the post-Soviet early 1990s, it was consist-
Congo province of Katanga in the early 1960s ently the richest regional sub-units of estab-
to the rise of Catalan demands for independ- lished states that have had strong motives to
ence in the 1980s to the independence of the defect from the encompassing unit.
Baltic States, as well as of Croatia and Slovenia
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c) Post-modernization. After having hinted at some of the trajectories
that drive the transition of polities, namely democratization, and those
of economies, namely globalization, let me briefly refer to post-
modernization as the driving force of cultural change.
Three generalizations can be offered, pertaining alike to the esthetic,
cognitive and moral-political ingredients of culture. First, there are
powerful trends towards the transnational homogenization of culture.
At least as far as the male and the urban segments of global society are
concerned, movies, music, everyday dress, food and life styles are in the
process of losing much of their distinctiveness and evident rootedness in
national and regional cultural traditions, as much as English is in the
process of becoming the global idiom. But, second, powerful counter-
tendencies are also to be observed, leading to the rediscovery and revival
of local esthetic and religious traditions which are adopted as symbolic
means of resistance to the uniformity of global culture and which give
rise to a post-modern cultural politics of identity, difference and tribal-
ism. Third, the moral and political impulse provided by ideas of lib-
eration, social justice, and international peace seem to have lost much of
their appeal and potential for political mobilization. This applies, in
particular, to any notion of progress that would involve, as once did
liberal modernization theory, revolutionary Marxism or the missionary
zeal of Christianity, a universalistic notion of desirable ends towards
which history should move and can actually be moved by properly
constituted agents and their strategies of change. If anything, this
notion of progress, to the extent to which it survived at all the disor-
ganizing forces of cultural post-modernism, is now being reformulated:
progress is now conceived of as the continuous avoidance of a collective
relapse into barabarism and catastrophic forms of de-civilization.
2. Innovating and designing the relations between state,
society and communities
If these are the internally highly contradictory and ambiguous his-
torical forces in which political agency is embedded and with which it
must deal, the problem lies in determining what kinds of institution are
best suited to cope with them. Our problem is most definitely not
Lenin's problem, as captured in his famous question of 'What is to be
done?'. Instead, our problem can be formulated as the logically prior
question of 'who', i.e. what configuration of agents, might at all be
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capable of doing whatever 'is to be done'. Questions of institutional
reform are conventionally framed in terms of which spheres of life should
be governed by political authorities, contractual market exchange, or
self-governing and responsible communities and associations (12).
Concerning this ever-contested division of domains, social scientists, on
the basis of their professional expertise, have little privileged insights to
offer. At best, they can elaborate, on the basis of empirical observation
and the analysis of causal mechanisms, as well as feasibility and
consistency assessments, some critical arguments which can inform
judgement on these matters. What to avoid is more obvious than what
actually to do. Old design options are obsolete, regardless of whether we
already know this or are in the process of slowly coming to understand
it. Old design options are monistic, relying on the state, the market, or
the community as the ultimate guarantors of social order and cohesion.
More promising solutions are essentially 'impure': none of the three
principles of social order is to be relied upon exclusively, but none of
them is to be denied some role within a composite and complex 'mix' of
institutional arrangements. These three partial components of social
order stand in a precarious relation to each other: on the one hand, they
rely on each other, as each of the components depends upon the func-
tioning of the two others. On the other hand, their relationship is anta-
gonistic, as the predominance of any one of them risks to undermine the
viability of the two others (13).
Let us examine the three components in turn. The state, the market
and the community represent ideal-typical modes in which people live
and act together, the mode of coordination of individuals and their
action (14). Each of them, as it were, activates and relies upon one of the
three collectively relevant capacities by which human beings can shape
the social world: reason, interest and passion.
The state can be thought of, as the 17th century political theorists in
fact did, as a creature of human reason, both in terms of its coming into
being through a rational contract and in view of its day-to-day 'formal
rational' operation through bureaucratic rule (Weber). Reason is the
(12) Cf. Wolgang STREECK and Philippe C. alization of modes of coordination through
SCHMITTEH, Community, Market, State — and social norms, coercive power and material
Associations? The Prospective Contribution incentives. Also, Gunnar Folke SCHUPPERT,
of Interest Governance to Social Order, Euro- Assoziative Demokratie. Zum Platz des orga-
pean Sociological Review, i (1985), No. 2, nisierten Menschen in der Demokratietheorie,
119-138. in Ansgar KLEIN, Rainer SCHMALZ-BRUNS
(13) Streeck and Schmitter, op. cit. 119/. (eds), Politische Beteiligung und Biirgerengage-
(14) Cf. Amitai ETZIONI, A Comparative ment in Deutschland (Baden-Baden: Nomos
Analysis of Complex Organizations (New York: 1997), 114-152.
The Free Press, 1961) for a similar conceptu-
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capacity of individuals to find out and recognize what is good for all; in
this sense, Hegel could even equate the state with reason.
The market is, of course, driven by the interest of human agents in
the purposive acquisition of individual goods without any or much of a
consideration of, or control over, what the pursuit of acquisitive
purposes will do to others or to our future selves, be it in the positive
sense (as the wealth of nations being promoted through an 'invisible
hand') or in the negative sense (with crises, injustices, social conflict, or
environmental damages as an aggregate outcome that, as market logic
implies, nobody can foresee and nobody is accountable for).
Finally, there is the notion that social order presupposes or, at any rate
benefits from, the rights and duties that are attached to the members of
concrete communities of persons. The cement that integrates the
members of such communities is human passion (such as love, honor,
pride, or a sense of loyalty and faithful attachment). From these com-
munities, be they families, religious groups, or those defined by shared
ethnic traditions, we derive our identity, our sense of belonging, and the
commitment to an ethical model that informs our life plans.
Each of these three types of human capacities, generating corre-
sponding patterns of social order, specializes in maximizing one dis-
tinctive value. This value is equality of legal status, comprising duties
and rights, in the case of states; freedom of choice in the case of markets;
and identity and its preservation (through commitment, solidarity and
loyalty) in the case of communities. While justice is an important
consideration within all three of these patterns of social order, the op-
erational meaning of justice differs significantly (15). In the case of the
modern state, the mark of justice is the extent to which the rights, most
often equal rights of all citizens under a constitution and the rule of law
principle, is guaranteed and enforced by state agencies. Market justice,
in contrast, emphasizes the entitlement of partners in market transac-
tions to obtain what was agreed upon between them in contracts they
voluntarily entered into, i.e. desert on the basis of contractual agree-
ments. Finally, justice within communities is a standard defined accord-
ing to the criteria of recognized need. The members of communities are
called upon, in the name of some community-specific justice, to come to
the assistance of needy members even if they have in no way 'earned' the
claim to such assistance through contributions made by them or through
legal entitlements assigned to them by state authorities, with the group
deciding, according to its standards and traditions, who is in legitimate
need of what.
(15) Cf. David MILLER, Social Justice {Oxford: Oxford UP, 1979).
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What this brief exercise in sociological basics is intended to help us
understand is the truth of two related propositions. First, providing for
social order and stability through institutions cannot rely on one of these
patterns—state, market, community—alone. Any 'monistic' institution-
al design tends to ignore (on the theoretical plane) and destroy (in its
practical implications) the contributions that the other two components
of the social order have to make. Second, it cannot even rely on a com-
bination of any two (that is, excluding the respective third) of these
patterns, be it a market-state, state-community, or community-market
synthesis. We need all three foundations of social order, and in a mix that
prevents them from undercutting each other (16). The problem of
designing appropriate institutions can thus be formulated as that of
keeping an appropriate distance from the extremes of 'pure' solutions
while at the same time avoiding 'too little' use of any one of them. This
demarcating of the components of social order, of correcting, maintain-
ing, and fine-tuning the mix within the bounds of a complex balance is
what, I submit, 'civil society' is about.
The 'pure' doctrines are easily recognized. First, social democratic
statism (although that is the doctrine least often advocated as a 'pure'
public philosophy these days) emphasizes the activist use of strong
governing capacities as the key to social order and social justice. It is
opposed by market liberalism, or rather libertarianism, as a doctrine that
proposes to rely on social coordination to be effected through price
signals and little else, thus advocating privatization, deregulation, and
the demolition of status rights, particularly the status rights of labor.
Finally, there are religious as well as non-religious communitarian and
social conservative public philosophies which emphasize the shared
meaning, mission and identity of family, religious and national com-
munities as the ultimate foundation of social cohesion. These are the
three competing types of public philosophies that stand out at the end of
the 20th century. Needless to observe, systems of political parties in
many countries reflect this configuration of public philosophies, divided
as they are into socialist/social democratic parties, market liberal parties,
and parties envisaging social order in terms of religious or ethnic iden-
tities.
(16) The standard cases of such undercut- 'overregulated' economy. Cf. also the notion of
ting and mutual displacement are, on the one a 'depletion of the moral heritage' by political
hand, the 'dependent state' whose regulatory and economic modernization in Fred HIRSCH,
and governing capacity is reduced by national Social Limits to Growth (Cambridge: Harvard
and international monetary markets and UP, 1976).
investors' decisions and, on the other, the
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The problem of designing and defending state-society relations,
however, is not that of opting simplemindedly for one of the three,
but of engaging in, or, at the very least, tolerating a process of the
ongoing design, readjustment and fine-tuning of a rich and adequate
mix in which all three building blocks of social order have a mutually
limiting and variable role. The capacity to invent, implement and toler-
ate such ideologically and quintessentially impure patchworks of social
order is the mark of civility or 'civilness', i.e. the ability and willingness
of citizens to utilize open and peaceful deliberation as well as the
institutional methods of carrying out social and political conflict.
Civilness and the political resources afforded by liberal democracy en-
able us to address the dilemmas posed by the fact that we live beyond the
age that could (if only seemingly) be mastered by the clean and simple
pronouncements of some 'correct line', 'ruling doctrine', 'one best way',
or, for that matter, 'Washington consensus'. Civilness, in other words,
can be conceived of as the Archimedean point outside the force of
gravity of any of the three paradigms of social order from which their
relative scope can be evaluated and re-configured. Civilness is the virtue
encouraged by those cooperative and deliberative practises which are the
common core of the various notions and models of civil society cur-
rently proposed.
To insist upon any 'correct line' is to silence democratic voice by
claiming superior and privileged insight. Such silencing has been, for
instance, the epistemological principle of Thatcherism, with its key
slogan 'There is no alternative!', rightly ridiculed as the TiNA-rule. If,
however, institution building according to some 'correct line' can no
longer be performed by philosophers and ideologues, it follows a
contrario that the key role of designing and preserving social order must,
in an age that has outgrown the schemes of ideologists, reside with the
citizens and their civic associations themselves. In an essentially 'mixed'
institutional world, we need informed public judgement and deliberative
civic engagement instead of authoritative expert knowledge as to what to
do and what not to do. Needless to emphasize, such judgement will
always come as the result of often vehement conflicts of interest, ideol-
ogy and identity which the democratic regime form allows to emerge and
to be carried out in civilized ways. It appears that today both socialist
statist egalitarians and social conservative communitarians have come
to recognize and heed the need for self-limitation in applying their
respective inherited guiding principles of social order; yet most market
liberals are lagging behind in the reflexive art of relativizing their own
creed. Many of them have still to overcome their often almost 'revolu-
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tionary' and single-minded belief in the salutary potential of an ever
more unscrupulous unleashing of market forces.
The only correct answer to a question such as 'What is the optimal
size of government?' is: we don't know! Or rather: the answer is not one
that can be given in the form of a compelling economic or philosophical
argument, but only in the course and as the outcome of well-informed
democratic deliberation carried out within and between collective
actors, both formal and informal, within civil society. To be sure,
demonstrating by scholarly methods inconsistencies and unfeasibilities
will help the public to make more enlightened choices. But the answer
remains ultimately a matter of 'voice', not of 'proof, or of some objec-
tive measure of 'rationality'. The relationship and demarcation line
between market, state and community is itself a matter of politics (17).
As a consequence, almost any answer to the question of the proper role
and desirable relative size of macro-social organizing principles of the
political economy will be controversial and essentially contested.
3. Six fallacies
If we pursue further the idea of an ongoing 'civic mix' of the various
ingredients of social order as opposed to an elite-sponsored imposition
of any single one of those ingredients, we arrive at a list of six patho-
logical approaches to the building of social and political institutions, or
six fallacies. Three of them result from the single-minded reliance upon
any one of our three building blocks, and the other three from the pre-
mise that any of the three can entirely be left out of the architecture of
social order. I hasten to add that these various fallacies will probably
differ as to the seriousness of their impact and the frequency with which
they occur under the regime of the current Zeitgeist. In spite of these
differences in seriousness and probability, let me briefly review each of
the six fallacies in turn.
a) The fallacy of excessive statism. It might seem that after the
breakdown of the type of state socialism that reigned in the Soviet
empire, as well as after the collapse of much of the intellectual he-
gemony of Keynesianism in the 1980s, the orthodoxy of excessive
(17) STRETTON, Hugh and Lion ORCHARD, Attack on Government (London: Saint
Public Goods, Public Enterprise, Public Choice: Martin's, 1994).
Theoretical Foundations of the Contemporary
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statism has become an entirely unlikely affliction. The breakdown of
state socialism has rendered obsolete a model of statist authoritarian
protection and productivist dirigisme, leaving behind in many of the
post-socialist societies the craving for a 'market economy without an
adjective'. (This is the prescription of the former Czech Prime minister
Vaclav Klaus, who proposed to eschew the specification of the market
economy as 'social'.)
However, it seems all-important to keep in mind the difference
between a big state (as measured in terms of the size of the budget or the
number of state employees) and a strong state, i.e. a state whose govern-
ance has a significant impact upon the level and distribution of life
chances within civil society (i 8). It may well happen that a state is
oversized and undereffective at the same time, and that the goods it
generates are in fact not public goods, but categorical (or 'club') goods
enjoyed by what has been called the 'state bourgeoisie', which may come
in a military as well as a civilian version. However, 'big' states usually
also pretend to be 'strong' states. Instead of serving civil society in any
tangible sense, they exercise oligarchic control over actors within civil
society. There is an ongoing debate within advanced societies as to which
spheres of life and collective provision should be adopted or maintained
by the state authorities, and which should be left to, or transferred to,
markets or communities.
A healthy antidote to the pathology of a reliance upon the 'strong' (or
rather 'big') state is to scrutinize whether the practice of governance
does actually live up to the statist version of the ideal of justice, namely
the legally guaranteed equality of opportunities (19). Does a marginal
increase in state capacity demonstrably enhance the equal enjoyment by
citizens of the provision of such basics as access to the courts, legal
protection, the provision of health services, education, housing and
transportation? Or would, conceivably, a marginal decrease in the size of
the state apparatus and its responsibilities serve this goal better? If so,
we might even get 'more for less'. The burden of proof in answering
such questions must reside with those who advocate more state spending
and public sector employment.
Liberal critics of big government must be granted the point that
excessive statism often inculcates dispositions of dependency, inactivity,
(18) Cf. World Bank, The state in a changing serves the professional upper middle class and
world. World development report 1997 (New their offspring much better than it does any
York: Oxford UP, 1997). other stratum in German society. In contrast,
(19) For instance, it can be easily demon- private university systems might easily be
strated that the system of tertiary education in regulated in ways that give greater weight to
Germany, an almost entirely statist system, considerations of social equality.
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rent-seeking, red tape, clientelism, authoritarianism, cynicism, fiscal
irresponsibility, avoidance of accountability, lack of initiative, and hos-
tility to innovation, if not outright corruption—and often so on either
side of the administration-client divide. In order to stem these tempta-
tions that are built into large scale public authorities and state respon-
sibilities, a highly developed ethos and commitment, as well as profession-
al competence, of the public sector personnel must be presumed, often
counterfactually. All these considerations tend to be unduly dismissed
by the (evidently rapidly shrinking numbers of) those who still believe
that more public expenditures and more public sector employment is
needed for, and will actually result in, the better production and more
equitable distribution of public goods.
b) The fallacy of 'too little' governing capacity. But we should pay
equal attention to the pathologies that become manifest when the state is
made to 'wither away' under the onslaught of libertarian political forces
or under the impact of severe fiscal crises. As we all know, the state, at the
very minimum, is called upon to protect the life, property and liberty of
citizens, with the implication for modern society that the majority of
(adult) citizens who operate on the supply side of labor markets will
neither have their 'property' (i.e. their labor power) nor their liberty
protected in the absence of state-organized schooling, vocational train-
ing, housing, individual and collective labor law, and social security. For
in the absence of these services and status rights that we associate with
the modern welfare state, the labor market turns into what Polanyi
(quoting Blake) has called a 'satanic mill'. Similarly, markets for financial
assets, goods, and services cannot come into being nor, once in being,
continue to exist without the continuous generation and adjustment of
the norms of civil law, as well as the state-organized and guaranteed
enforcement of these norms through the court system within the con-
straints of the rule of law, to say nothing about 'targeted' industrial
policies aimed at the growth of particular sectors of industry. Much the
same applies to the protection of 'life' that states must supply through
military defense, and also the provision of basic health services, and the
protection of citizens from 'civil' violence committed against them by
other citizens (and, a fortiori, state agents themselves). In order to per-
form all these functions that are essential to a state, states must also be
capable of extracting the resources necessary for the performance of
these functions through a regime of taxation (20) that is, and is seen to
(20) Cf. Stephen HOLMES and Cass R. SUNSTEIN, The Costs of Rights. Why Liberty depends on
Taxes (New York: Norton, 1999).
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be, both fair and effective. Both in the developed world and in Latin
America, state reform aiming at the restoration of crumbling state
capacity is today seen as the top item on the agenda of domestic poli-
tics (21). Such deficiencies in the performance of states are being di-
agnosed today with respect to all aspects just mentioned: social protec-
tion, civil law, law and order, and the power to extract revenues. If
anything, we seem to be threatened more by the pathology of severe state
deficiencies than by the pathology of state hypertrophy, although market
liberals routinely emphasize the latter. Or, perhaps more accurately, we
suffer from the combined malaise of the oversized and underperforming
state.
c) The fallacy of excessive reliance on market mechanisms. Markets, i.e.
the competitive allocation of both the factors and results of production
mediated through the price signals, are very peculiar institutional
arrangements. Allegedly, markets respond to individual desires, as
expressed through effective demand. But it is well documented that even
highly favorable individual market outcomes do not contribute much to
the satisfaction of peoples' desires (22). For, except for the very lowest
income categories, life satisfaction and self-reported happiness are but
very weakly correlated with increases in market income and the subse-
quent effective demand such income allows to be made for goods and
services. The higher the incomes are, the less they are sought for the
satisfaction of needs other than the—entirely market-induced and
negative—'need' to avoid a relative loss of income. Few would disagree
that non-tradeable pleasures play a role for overall life satisfaction,
including, arguably, the pleasure derived from the perception of living in
a just society. Also, the market is said to reward efficiency, provided, that
is, that competitive advantages come as a premium for better production
methods or better products only, rather than as a premium for better
methods of tax evasion, of deceiving consumers, or of dumping parts of
the production costs upon the state budget or the general public. But
efficiency is valued almost exclusively in an environment where
efficiency laggards are punished, i.e. within markets. This is one of the
reasons why the market has been compared to a 'prison' in which we are
coerced to perform activities that are unrelated to our needs, while being
(21) Cf. Robert KAUFMAN, The Politics of Experience (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1991);
State Reform: A Review of Theoretical also Andrew J. OSWALD, Happiness and Eco-
Approaches and idem, The Next Challenges nomic Performance and Robert H. FRANK,
for Latin America, Working Papers No. 98 and The Frame of Reference as a Public Good, The
No. 108 (Madrid: Instituto Juan March, 1997). Economic Journal, 107(1997): 1815-1831 and
(22) Cf. Robert E. LANE, The Market 1832-1847.
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prevented from performing those which respond to them (23). Outside
of markets, there is no self-evident and absolute value attached to greater
efficiency. After all, non-market societies have sustained themselves for
centuries without any noticeable increase in efficiency. Markets place a
premium upon outcomes that are measured by markets as superior in
terms of efficiency. It is worth keeping in mind the circular logic of
markets. If we do so, we will be less impressed by the conventional
argument that market arrangements are preferable over other arrange-
ments because they yield greater efficiency. For that argument is vir-
tually as powerful as the argument that cherry trees are preferable over
all other trees because they bear cherries.
Furthermore, markets are supposed to 'clear'. But the very condi-
tions that make the very special market for labor tolerable as a social
arrangement (24), namely workers' status rights and the protective
regulation of employment (summarily referred to as 'decommodifica-
tion'), hinder the clearing of the labor market and exclude growing
numbers of potential workers from the possibility of becoming actual
workers, particularly after the level of efficiency of production has been
driven up through labor saving technical change. This market-inflicted
exclusion from the (labor) market, however, is in itself one of the
strongest known causes of decline in life satisfaction and self-reported
happiness.
Moreover, markets are known to be self-destructive in still another
sense. Once markets are left to themselves, rational actors will conspire,
in the interest of increasing their profits, to escape the competitive threat
coming from other market participants by forming cartels or monopo-
lies, thus subverting the ideal of 'freedom of choice' in whose name
markets are often defended. In other words, once competitive markets
are in place, it can by no means be assumed that they stay competitive in
the absence of some non-market agents enforcing competitiveness. In
addition, markets are known to be deaf and blind: deaf as to the present
negative externalities they cause, e.g. of an environmental sort, as well as
blind to the long term consequences of market transactions for those
involved in them.
Finally, not only do markets lack a self-reproductive mechanism, as
they constantly tend to subvert themselves into arrangements of
monopolistic power; but they also lack a self-restraining mechanism.
(23) Charles E. LINDBLOM, The Market as POLANYI, The Great Transformation. The Poli-
Prison, Journal of Politics, vol 44 (1982): 324- tical and Economic Origins of our Time (Boston:
336. Beacon, 1944).
(24) Cf. the 'satanic mill' argument in Karl
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Because they have no way of distinguishing between 'marketable' and
'non-marketable' items, they tend to flood the universe of social life and
marketize everything—unless, that is, the distinction is being imposed
upon them, again, from the outside—through a legal ban on market-
ability (e.g., to some extent, of addictive drugs or prostitution) or/and
through the standards of good taste and proper behavior established and
enforced by the ethics of communities. It is somewhat ironic to see that
the advocates of markets, committed as they are to competition and the
freedom of choice afforded by competition, tend to shy away from
appreciating the legitimacy of a second-order competition between the
market and other methods of generating and distributing valued items.
To illustrate, it can be said that in the European middle ages, the
scope of marketable items was much wider than it actually is within
modern market economies. Such a seemingly nonsensical proposition
does in fact make good sense if we remember that in the middle ages
among the goods traded were, as ordinary objects of commercial
exchange, items such as the salvation of one's soul, military force, the
right to marriage, and other goods that we have come to consider as
'non-tradeables'. Arguably, we are actually on our way back into the
middle ages, as increasingly fewer items appear to be solidly immune
from being 'for sale'. Examples might include doctoral titles, physical
attractiveness, public attention, court decisions, and even political
careers (to be acquired, respectively, through purchasing the services of
some academic institutions, beauty surgeons, media time, expensive
lawyers, or campaign staff). As markets are structurally intolerant of
non-market methods of generating and allocating valued items, they can
cause what has been called a 'low level trap'. Countries (such as the US)
where private commercial forms of provision are widely considered the
standard response to conditions of social need and where any expansion
of state and federal budgets is viewed with habitual alarm are at the same
time those where complementary welfare state provisions, to the very
limited extent they exist, are most easily demolished—the somewhat
paradoxical generalization being that the smaller the welfare state is, the
more precarious and vulnerable its residual arrangements, and the more
easily any attempt at its expansion will be frustrated (25).
Given all these features of the market and its mechanisms, it can
hardly be invoked as a self-evidently superior contribution to social
order. To the contrary, the market has rightly been considered, from
(25) Arguably, there is also the reverse downward revisions and behaving stubbornly
paradox of a 'high level trap', with 'big' welfare path-dependent,
states (such as the Netherlands) defying
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Marx to Schumpeter and beyond, as an 'anarchic', 'subversive', 'revo-
lutionizing', and disorganizing pattern of social arrangements. At best,
the market's contribution to the creation of social order is strictly
contingent upon its being firmly embedded in constraints, restrictions,
regulations, limitations, status rights, and informal social norms
imposed upon it from the outside, by either the state or the community.
d) The fallacy of an excessive limitation of market forces. Yet still, and
as is the case with many poisonous substances, markets are indispensable
as powerful medicines, if administered in reasonable doses. Such is also
the case with appropriately constrained and regulated markets. A doc-
trinaire ban of market mechanisms from all spheres of social life would
deprive us of the salutary functions that markets can perform. Although
such a ban is rarely proposed today, it is still useful to remember for a
moment what markets are in fact good for. Four points come to mind.
First, market exchange, if properly supervised and policed, is usually
peaceful and non-violent, as 18th-century political economists were well
aware when they praised the virtues of doux commerce (26). While this
'pacifist' defense of markets, as applied to the history of the 20th century
with its experience of the conquest and defence of markets through
imperialist powers, may well be called into question, it maintains much
of its validity at the micro level. People who relate to each other as actual
or potential partners in market exchange normally have little reason to
go at each other's throats. To the contrary, they may even develop some
sense of 'sympathy' for each other, as Adam Smith was the first to sug-
gest. This is so because market outcomes, i.e. the terms of trade of
inputs and outputs (e.g. income earned per hour worked) cannot
plausibly be attributed to the (hostile) intentions of any actor, but are
due to some anonymous causation for which T have no one to blame but
'myself. Markets are learning environments that favor self-attribution
of both favorable and unfavorable outcomes and, as a result, a cognitive
frame of responsibility.
A further formative impact of the 'hidden curriculum' of markets is
that it favors learning. It has been claimed that markets, through their
continuous imposition of negative and positive sanctions upon partici-
pants in market transaction, make people more intelligent than they
would be outside of market contexts. But that proposition must be
qualified in that it applies only if the positive and negative rewards come
in the form of relatively moderate increments or losses. In contrast, if
(26) Albert O. HIRSCHMAN, The Passions talism before its Triumph (Princeton: Princeton
and the Interests, Political Arguments for Capi- UP, 1977).
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rewards change in quantum jumps, people stop learning and begin
either to mistake the market for a lottery (27) (in the case of big gains
that cannot be accounted for in terms of the recipient's prudent behav-
ior) or to respond fatalistically or in panic in the case of 'big' losses, the
disastrous proportions of which exceed the individual's capacity for
intelligent adjustment (28). Finally, the market has a powerful liberating
potential, as it allows the holder of marketable assets to escape the
control of either communities or state bureaucracies (29). To the extent
that markets can be demonstrated to actually redeem its potential for
inculcating the spirit of peaceful and civilized interaction, of respon-
sibility, of intelligent adjustment, and of liberation from the grip of
authoritarian and paternalistic powers, they can certainly not be dis-
missed as essential building blocks of the institutional structure of social
life.
e) The fallacy of excessive communitarianism. A powerful representa-
tion of current realities is multiculturalism. This doctrine of political
post-modernism tends to code people not in terms of citizenship, but in
terms of 'identity'. It emphasizes a 'politics of difference', a difference
that is not always conceived of as being bridged or reconciled by
common national, civic or class interests. It responds to the mass
phenomenon, both present and historical, of voluntary as well as
involuntary trans-national migration. In the North-Atlantic West, the
politics of difference and identity is a philosophical response to the
widespread disenchantment with the premises of liberal individualism
and its socialist concomitant of universalism. In order to become aware
of yourself, you must discover, recognize and cultivate the distinctive
'roots' that tie you to your family of origin and, beyond that, to ethnic,
(27) This is a view of how markets operate time 'earning their own money' and thus
that is widely to be encountered in post- escaping the control of parents, or that clients
socialist economies with their sudden and of newly privatized telephone companies enjoy
conspicuous emergence of the nouveaux riches. when given the chance to put together their
(28) This is nicely illustrated by a story that own service package, rather than being forced
was being told in the context of the economic to pay for what the former state monopoly
transition in Poland. Suppose the price of coal would offer as the single standard package. It
doubles during a cold winter. In response, must be noted, however, that the experience of
people will economize on heating and work such enthusiastic feelings of liberation may
harder (which in itself keeps them warm) in be more of a transition phenomenon than
order to earn the necessary additional income something attached to the steady state of mar-
to buy coal. Now suppose the price of coal ket routines. Nevertheless, the desire of both
increases by the factor of five. What will be the states and communities to extend authoritarian
response? People give up and stay in bed. or paternalistic control over individuals can
(29) It is this experience of escaping the only be checked by keeping the exit option of
control of power holders that young entrants markets permanently open.
to the labor market enjoy when for the first
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linguistic, religious communities and their life forms. Feminism pro-
vides another cognitive map that emphasizes gender identities, and the
'politics of the body' (age, food, health status, sexual orientation) is
further invoked in the construction of difference based on physical
characteristics, practices, and preferences (30).
Following the model of group rights conceded to Afro-Americans in
consideration of the lasting discrimination against their citizen status
and life chances, identity politics has become a widely copied strategy of
self-declared 'groups' to gain access to cultural and other privileges.
Similarly, in post-communist countries, we see a dramatic rise of the
politics of ethnic, religious and linguistic identity politics and ethnic
nationalism which, however, is not limited in its potential for violent
separatism to the post-communist world; Northern Ireland and the
Basque country, and not just Chechnya and Bosnia, illustrate the
potential of identity politics for terror and horror. In East and West
alike, doctrines of ethnic nationalism have rarely failed to unfold hostile
and repressive inclinations that interfere with 'dissenting' citizens' and
'strangers" civil and political rights. Even in its more benign forms (such
as Quebec), the communitarian politics of identity and difference tend to
be exclusive, anti-egalitarian, and notoriously difficult to reconcile with
civic principles of neutrality and 'color-blind' toleration. Even if it is not
openly exclusive, the emphasis upon ascriptive groups and group soli-
darities violates egalitarian standards due to the simple fact that not
everybody does actually belong to, or at any rate identify with, a group
thus defined. Even those who share in ascriptive characteristics that
supposedly make up a 'group' may wish to 'opt out' of its solidarity
networks because of the often authoritarian or paternalist patterns such
quasi-tribal groups tend to develop.
The tensions that exist between identity politics and principles of
egalitarian citizenship can be explained by the particular difficulties
encountered by the attempt at civilized resolution of identity conflicts
when compared to the resolution of class conflict (31). Identity, or the
passionate identification with some community, is almost by definition
inalienable and non-negotiable. While class conflict is carried out
between collective actors who depend upon each other (even if asym-
metrically so) and for that reason take some, at least implicit, interest in
the well-being of their opponents, the protagonists of identity conflicts,
(30) Agnes HELLER, Biopolitics. The Politics Constitutional Democracy: Coping with
of the Body, Race and Nature (Aldershot: Ave- Identity through Group Rights, The Journal of
bury, 1996). Political Philosophy, 6 (1998), No. 2: 113-141.
(31) Cf. Claus OFFE, 'Homogeneity' and
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at least in their most radical version, tend to portray outsiders as people
whose very absence from 'our' community or national territory is the
condition of the fulfillment of 'our' aspirations for 'purity'— an aspira-
tion that all too often has led to the practice and justification of ethnic
cleansing.
f) The fallacy of neglecting communities and identities. But, again, this
is just one side of the debate. On the other side it is claimed, with some
plausibility, that communities and identities that we are 'born into' are
the most potent generators of our moral commitments and capacities.
Communities such as families, religious associations and ethnic nations
provide individuals with a sense of meaning and mission, as well as with
all the feelings of pride, trust, love, guilt, honor, commitment, etc. that
can perhaps only be acquired in communities, which thus play a unique-
ly important role in the reproduction of cultural traditions and ethical
values. Only communities can generate, or so the communitarian
argument goes, 'strong' individuals who are prepared to be held
accountable for their acts and thoughts, as opposed to spineless oppor-
tunists. And it is not only the unique contribution that communities
presumably can make to solving problems of social order and social
integration that then deserve recognition and protection through state
policies. They are deserving also because communities, almost like a
cultural genetic pool of society, cannot be manufactured or artificially
reproduced. The need to protect communitarian cultures applies spe-
cifically, or so it is argued, if they are seen to be exposed to a threat of
extinction originating with market or political forces of modernization.
At any rate, much of the evidence demonstrates that 'ascriptive' col-
lectivities based on religious, gender, age, regional, ethnic and other
identities that people are 'born with' have provided the moral energies
which have driven public-regarding innovation and social and political
advances. The same can be said of less ascriptive, but still relatively
permanent identities that are based upon people's belonging to local
communities or professional categories (32). The new social movements
of the 60s and 70s are cases in point (33). In many places, movements of
students, women, and ethnic or racial minorities, as well as local com-
munities have been the pioneer promoters of civil rights and a sharpen-
ed moral and political awareness of issues of liberation, toleration, social
justice, and ecological or environmental concerns. Granting and guar-
(32) Judith TENDLER, Good Government in VER, The Critical Mass in Collective Action: a
the Tropics (Baltimore: John Hopkins UP, Micro-Social Theory (Cambridge: Harvard
1997). UP, 1993).
(33) Cf. Gerald MARWELL and Pamela OLI-
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anteeing the necessary space for the social and political action of these
communities and promoting their associative practices (rather than
displacing them through paternalist and/or repressive state action)
would therefore appear to be a necessary precondition for the further
collectively beneficial use of these communal forces and modes of
action.
4. Conclusion
The three antinomies of social and political order I have discussed
are not to be resolved by grandiose schemes that either philosophers or
political ideologists might supply. What we are left with is a repertoire of
partly contradictory, partly complementary arguments and observations
that can be brought to bear upon the critique and reconstruction of
existing institutional arrangements. For there is no such thing as unique-
ly 'rational' institutions or state-society relations. On the contrary, these
antinomies and ideological rivalries must (and, I believe, can) be re-
solved through practises of civility and deliberation which unfold 'in
between' the poles of our conceptual triangle of 'pure', if largely obso-
lete, solutions.
The three forces, or options for institution building, that I have dis-
cussed here in a rather schematic fashion, tend to undercut each
other (34). They also depend upon each other. As none of them is dis-
pensable, the need for self-limitation of the proponents of each of them
becomes evident. Emerging institutional forms of public-regarding
agency do in fact emphasize, if only in negative ways, necessary limita-
tions. For instance, we speak of 'non-governmental' organizations or the
'non-profit' sector. With equally good reasons, we might call for 'non-
sectarian', i.e. non-exclusive or non-discriminatory kinds of commu-
nities. These three negations combined are, or so it seems, a very good
conceptual approximation to the idea of civic associability and the social
capital that enables people to engage in associative practices.
The civic use of social capital and the associative practises in which it
manifests itself may be deemed to be an overly idyllic and harmonistic
way out of the dilemma of social order. For advocates of such practises
often seem to ignore or belittle the realities of social power and power-
lessness. Categories of social actors may take a rational interest in the
(34) Streeck and Schmitter, loc. cit.
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spreading of hegemonic discourses which favor community-centered,
statist, or market-based versions of social order. Social scientists do not
have a good understanding as to which strategies, conditions, and per-
ceptions drive such hegemonic discourses which actually succeed in
privileging one model of social order at the expense of its effectively
discredited alternatives. And neither do we understand the sometimes
abrupt changes that give rise to new hegemonic discourses, such as the
free market orthodoxy, and the sudden dis-establishment of previously
institutionalized models of social order. All we can perhaps say is that
the semantic class struggles which lead to the spread and consolidation
of hegemonic cognitive frames and moral intuitions are subject, as to
their outcomes, to the formation of judgement and the autonomous
confrontation of experience and evaluative standards to which civic
associations can give rise. In this sense, social capital is not neutral with
respect to power, but the very essence of the capacity of civil society to
challenge and limit its reach.
It is a truism that such a culture of civility does not automatically
emerge with the demise of authoritarian regimes and the transition
to—or even consolidation of—the democratic regime form. The
ongoing fine-tuning and critical, flexible, as well as imaginative recom-
bination of the three disparate components of the institutional order is
driven by the 'social capital' (35), available within civil society, widely
referred to in contemporary social science as the source of energy that
'makes democracy work'. By the term 'social capital' we refer to a syn-
drome of cognitive and moral dispositions of citizens that lead them to
extend trust to anonymous fellow citizens (as well as the political
authorities that, after all, one's fellow citizens have endowed with poli-
tical power), to practise the 'art of association' (36), and to be attentive to
public (as opposed to their own narrowly circumscribed group-specific)
affairs and problems. Fair and transparent institutions of government,
the prosperity that carefully regulated markets can generate, and the life
of communities restrained by the principle of toleration can and must all
contribute to (and in turn benefit from) the formation and accumulation
of social capital within civil society, the associational forces of which are
better capable of defining and constantly refining the 'appropriate mix'
of institutional patterns than any self-declared 'experts' or intellectual
protagonists of some 'pure' doctrine of social order.
(35) Robert A. PUTNAM, Making Democracy (36) Alexis de TOCQUEVILLE, Democracy in
Work (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1993)- America, 2 vol. (New York: Schocken, 1961).
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